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RECENT DECISIONS
BANKRUPTCY-PRIORITIES-STATUS OF EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNION
WELFARE FuNn-Under a collective bargaining agreement an employer was
required to contribute eight dollars monthly to a union welfare fund for
each of its employees who were union members. A trust agreement authorized the trustees of this fund to file claims of priority in any proceeding
involving the employer's insolvency. In a bankruptcy proceeding the trustees
of the fund sought priority as wage claimants for the employer's unpaid
contributions to the fund which had accrued during the three months
prior to bankruptcy. In the same proceeding the United States sought
priority for unpaid taxes. The referee ruled that the unpaid employer
contributions were not "wages" within section 64a(2) of the Bankruptcy
Act,1 and relegated the trustee's claim to the status of payments due unsecured creditors. The district court vacated the referee's order and granted
wage priority to the employer contributions.2 On appeal, held, affirmed.
Since employer contributions to union welfare funds are in a realistic sense
part of the agreed compensation for services rendered, and are also bargained for as an integral part of the wage package, they must be considered
as "wages" under section 64a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act. Matter of Embassy
Restaurant, (3d Cir. 1958) 254 F. (2d) 475, cert. granted 79 S. Ct. 42 (1958).
The Bankruptcy Act provides for priority in the payment of certain
debts, and designates five classes of priority claims, each of which is given
precedence in payment over succeeding classes. Wages are given second
priority and government tax claims are fourth. 3 Priority under the bankruptcy law was accorded wages long before fringe benefits such as welfare
plans became common.4 Such fringe benefits have now become an important part of the wage structure, and special attention is given to these
benefits in collective bargaining practices.5 As a result of this increase in
importance, courts have been faced with the problem of determining
whether "wages" as used in the priority section of the Bankruptcy Act
should include fringe benefits. It has been held that vacation pay,6 back

130 Stat. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §104(a).
2 Matter of Embassy Restaurant, (E.D. Pa. 1957) 154 F. Supp. 141.
8 "(a} The debts to have priority ••• and the order of payment, shall be • . • (2)
wages and commissions, not to exceed $600 to each claimant, which have been earned
within three months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding, due to
workmen .•• (4) taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States.•••"
11 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §104(a).
4 The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 was the first to give priority status to "wages." For
legislative history, see 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., §§64.01, 64.201 (1941; Supp. 1957).
5 79 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 172, 812 (1956); Bulletin No. 1113, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "'Vages and Related Benefits-40 Labor Markets
-1951-1952."
6 ln re Kinney Aluminum, (S.D. Cal. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 565 at 568-569; United States
v. Monro-Van Helms Co., (5th Cir. 1957) 243 F. (2d) 10 at 13.
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pay,7 severance pay8 and disability insurance premiums deducted by the
employer and paid to an insurance company9 are "wages" under section
64a(2). Despite this authority for a liberal definition of "wages," the
federal courts are divided on the question whether employer contributions
to union welfare funds, one of the most common types of fringe benefits,
are entitled to priority as "wages . . . due to workmen." 10 The courts
which have denied priority to such unpaid contributions have reasoned
that "wages . . . due to workmen" in the context of the Bankruptcy Act
include only direct, present payments to the employee rather than indirect,
deferred payments. 11 It is argued that the legislative intent behind the wage
priority section was only to provide emergency funds to the employee to
help him meet his needs during his period of unemployment. Since the
benefits that the employee derives from a welfare fund do not come directly
from the employer but are instead administered by the union and are
contingent on some future retirement or sickness, ·these courts have concluded that contributions to welfare funds were not intended to be given
priority.12 A broader purpose which today might be assigned to the wage
priority section, however, is that of insuring economic security for workers
·rather than merely guaranteeing them an emergency fund. 13 If this broader
purpose is recognized it is not difficult to fit employer contributions to
a welfare fund into the term "wages."14 No technical definition of this

Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952).
s McCloskey v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement, (9th Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 402.
9 In re Ross, (N.D. Cal. 1953) 117 F. Supp. 346.
10 Allowing priority: In re Otto, (S.D. Cal. 1956) 146 F. Supp. 786; In re Schmidt,
(S.D. Cal. 1953) 33 L.R.R.M. 2283. Denying priority: Local 140 Security Fund v. Hack,
(2d Cir. 1957) 242 F. (2d) 375, cert. den. 355 U.S. 833 (1957); In re Victory Apparel Mfg.
Corp., (D.C. N.J. 1957) 154 F. Supp. 819; In re Brassel, (N.D. N.Y. 1955) 135 F. Supp. 827.
In view of this confusion H.R. 8805 was introduced in the House of Representatives by
Representative Celler of New York to amend §64a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act to require
that wage priority be given to union welfare funds. The bill is pending in the House
Judiciary Committee.
11 Local 140 Security Fund v. Hack, note 10 supra, at 377-378; In re Brassel, note
IO supra; In re Victory Apparel Mfg. Corp., note 10 supra. See also Forman, "Priority
of Union Welfare Funds as Wages in Bankruptcy,". 62 Cor.r. L.J. 321 (1957); note, 42
MINN. L. R.Ev. 295 (1957); COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., §64.201 at 2083 (1941; Supp.
1957.
12 See cases cited in note 11 supra. The fact that the priority claim is limited to $600
in §64a(2) may be used to support the "emergency fund" argument.
13 This argument gains added force in light of unemployment compensation benefits
available on termination of employment. See note, 66 YALE L.J. 449 at 460-461 (1957). See
also In re Inland Waterways, Inc., (D.C. Minn. 1942) 71 F. Supp. 134; In re Paradise Catering Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1941) 36 F. Supp. 974; In re Lawsam Electric Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1924)
300 F. 736; comment, 52 N.W. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 681 (1957). The court in the principal case
at 476 points out that the achievement of complete economic security for workers is the
goal of organized labor.
14 "The term 'wages', as used in this section, has received a very liberal construction."
In re Roebuck Weather Strip and Wire Screen Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1910) 180 F. 497 at 498.
See also note, 66 YALE L.J. 449 at 459 (1957). The granting of priority to the welfare fund
may be to the detriment of the general creditors in some cases. However, the wage earners
7
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term is found in the act, and the usual definition of "wages" under section
64a(2) is "the agreed compensation for services rendered." 15 An employer's
contribution to a welfare fund generally represents another method of
computing and paying compensation for services rendered. 16 The compensation represented by these contributions is present security, a valuable
and direct benefit to the employee.17 If such an interpretation of the
term "wages" is adopted, however, a second argument can be made against
priority status for employer contributions to union welfare funds. This
argument is to the effect that the "wages" are not "due to workmen"
in the sense that the employee has no individual or assignable proprietary
interest in the welfare contribution.18 Yet the language of the statute
does not expressly require the worker to have an enforceable property
right in the wages which are due to him.19 The employee may not be able
to sue the employer directly to enforce his rights in the welfare fund but
the benefit of the fund is certainly "due" to the employee. The Supreme
Court in a very recent decision rejected a similar argument made under
the Miller Act20 that trustees of a welfare fund could not sue as a "person
who has furnished labor ... for the sums justly due him." 21 This decision

and the union are involved with the employer in such a way that they cannot protect
themselves from the impending insolvency of the employer, while the general creditors
are not usually so unavoidably involved with an insolvent.
15 In re Gurewitz, (2d Cir. 1903) 121 F. 982 at 983; In re New England Thread Co.,
(1st Cir. 1907) 158 F. 788 at 792. The term "wages" as used in other statutes has been
held to include employer's health and welfare contributions. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB,
(7th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 247 at 251, cert. den. 336 U.S. 960 (1949) (Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947); MacPherson v. Ewing, (N.D. Cal. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 666 (Social
Security Act); City of Avalon, (9th Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 500 (Federal Employment Tax
Act).
16 United States for Benefit and on Behalf of Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210 at 217
(1957); In re Otto, note IO supra, at 789. If a trust agreement specifically provided that
the welfare contributions were to be "non-wage benefits," should the court still give
priority to the contributions as "wages"? In other words, should the intent of the parties
govern or should all welfare contributions of this nature be given wage priority?
17 The worker is thus given priority in bankruptcy for medical, hospital, surgical,
and life insurance premiums, rather than cash. In re Otto, note IO supra, at 791.
18 "Liberality of construction of the term 'wages' does not justify a nullification of
the language of the statute which grants priority only to 'wages . . . due to workmen.'
The employers' contribution here is never due to the employee." In re Brassel, note IO
supra, at 830. See also In re Victory Apparel Mfg. Corp., note IO supra.
10 If the statute did require the employee to have a property right in the fund, various
theories could be used to find such a right. See note, 66 YALE L.J. 449 at 454, 457 (1957).
20 49 Stat. 794 (1935), 40 U.S.C. (1952) §§270a and 270b.
21 United States for Benefit and on Behalf of Sherman v. Carter, note 16 supra. The
Court's reply to the contention made was, at 220: "The trustees stand in the shoes of the
employees and are entitled to enforce their rights.••• [T]hese [welfare] contributions
are in substance as much 'justly due' to the employees who have earned them as are the
wages payable directly to them in cash.'' Although the statutory language of the Miller
Act is broader than that of §64a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, the case does illustrate the
Supreme Court's attitude in recognizing the union welfare fund as a primary benefit to
the employee and as part of the compensation for the work done.
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does not provide a binding precedent for the principal case, but it perhaps indicates that the Supreme Court is disposed to follow a liberal policy
with respect to protection of union welfare funds. The holding in the
principal case represents a non-technical construction of section 64a(2)
which comports with what today should be regarded as the broad purpose
of that provision. An affirmance of the principal case by the Supreme
Court, extending to union welfare funds priority status, would serve to
buttress current labor activity which has strengthened employee security.

John W. Simpson

